---------------------------------------

In re

SERVICE OIL, INC., : Appeal No. 07-02


1201 Constitution Avenue, NW.
Washington, D.C.

Thursday, June 5, 2008

The HEARING in this matter began at approximately 11:04 a.m. pursuant to notice. BEFORE:

JUDGE KATHIE A. STEIN
JUDGE CHARLES SHEEHAN
JUDGE ANNA L. WOLGAST

```
APPEARANCES:
    On behalf of Environmental Protection Agency:
    MARK RYAN. ESQUIRE
    Office of Regional Counsel
    United States Envirommental Protection Agency
    Region 10, Idaho Operations Office
    1435 N. Orchard Street
    Boise, Idaho }8370
    (208) 378-5768
    On behalf of Service Oli. lnc.:
        JOHN T. SHOKLEY. ESQUIRE
        Ohnstad Twichell, P.C.
        901 13th Avenue East. 2nd Floor
        P.O. Box }45
        West Fargo, North Dakota 58078-0458
        (70I) 282-3249
ALSO PRESENT:
    EURIKA DURR
    Board of Environmental Appeals
    GARY JONESI
    Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance
    ELYANA SUTIN
    Region 8 Office of the Regional Council
    PAUL BANGSER
    Office of General Counsel
        PROCEEDINGS
    MS. DURR: The Environmental
Appeals Board of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency is now in
session for oral argument. In re: Service
Oil Inc. Docket Number CWA-08-2005-0010.
CWA Appeal No. 07-02. The Honorable Judges
Anna Wolgast, Charles Sheehan, and Kathie
Stein presiding. Please turn off all cell
phones and no recording devices are allowed.
Please be seated.
```

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Good morning. We are hearing oral argument this morning in the matter of Service Oil Inc. In appeal from an initial decision by Judge Biro, who found Service Oil liable for two counts under the Clean Water Act, totaling the civil penalty of $\$ 35,640$.

On appeal certain aspects of liability and penalty are challenged. In our order of April 30th the Board instructed the parties to focus primarily on the 308 Clean
PPEARANCES:

MARK RYAN. ESQUIRE
Office of Regional Counsel United States Envirommental Protection Agency 1435 N. Orchard Street Boise, Idaho 83706 (208) 378-5768

On behalf of Service Oli. Inc.:
OHN T. SHOKLEY. ESOUIRE
Ohnstad Twichell, P.C. P.O. Box 458 (70I) 282-3249

ALSO PRESENT:
EURIKA DURR
Board of Environmental Appeals
GARY JONESI
保 Region 8 Office of the Regional Council

Office of General Counsel

*     *         *             *                 * 


## PROCEEDINGS

MS. DURR: The Environmental Appeals Board of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency is now in session for oral argument. In re: Service
Oil Inc. Docket Number CWA-08-2005-0010.
CWA Appeal No. 07-02. The Honorable Judges
Anna Wolgast, Charles Sheehan, and Kathie
Stein presiding. Please turn off all cell
phones and no recording devices are allowed.
Please be seated.
12

Water Act issuc. And while we hold to that undoubtedly questions they will stray in to penalty issues as well. So we expect to be penalty issues as well. So we expect to be
asking questions about penalties in addition to 308 issues.

On the order of proceeding, we will follow the order set forth in the April 30th and May 7th scheduling orders. Service Oil is allocated 30 minutes. It may reserve 5
minutes at the beginning for rebuttal and the is allocated 30 minutes. It may reserve S
minutes at the beginning for rebuttal and the Region is also allotted 30 minutes. Service Oil will go first.

About questions during oral argument, inferences are not to be drawn from any particular line of questions that may be asked. Devil's advocacy is alive and well. And now I will ask counsel to state their names for the record, whom they represent, and we will go from there. Mr. Shockley.

MR. SHOCKLEY: John T. Shockley, here on behalf of Service Oil.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: And for the Agency?

MR, RYAN: Mark Ryan.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Okay. So Mr.
Shockley, you may proceed with your argument and tell us at the offset if you wish to reserve 5 minutes for rebuttal.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Thank you, Your Honor, I do wish to reserve 5 minutes for rebuttal. May it please the Court, my name is John Shockley, and I am here on behalf of Service Oil. The factual background of this case is unique to this area.

Service Oil is a company that is involved in retailing diesel and gas in this region. It has been doing this for years.
It has developed significant business relationships in the community. The cited issue is commonly referred to in -- below, as the "staymark" site.

The staymark site is located in Fargo, North Dakota which is in the center of the Red River Valley. Prior to starting construction on this site it was ag land.

The construction on this site started in approximately 2002.

In the fall of 2002, inspectors from the North Dakota Department of Health, along with the Environmental Protection Agency appeared at the site. They asked permission to enter the site, and they were granted that. And I would note that Service Oil did not refuse permission to enter the property. This inspection --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Mr. Shockley.
MR. SHOCKLEY: Yes.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Mr. Shockley, can we jump to the 308 issues please. I think we have a pretty clear sense of the factual background. Thank you. Your central argument, it seems to us is that 308 , in your word, is ambiguous, and that for the Agency to insist on a permit, obtaining a permit under 308 authority it must issue an individualized request or order to do so. What's your authority for that statement, if
or such methods at such locations at such intervals, and such a manner as administrator shall prescribe and provide other information as he shall require.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Then why -MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe that -JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why does that request from the administrator have to be individual, person by person, one by one? Why can the administrator under general regulatory authority issue broad regulations that require just that, but not target individual people?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, this is a -JUDGE SHEEHAN: After all, let me point out, 308(a) talks about the administrator having the authority to carry out the objective of the act; more specifically to carry out the objective of the NPDES program in (a)(4) to issue requirements in (a)(3) -- requirements and a lot like regulations. So why is it so
it's so unambiguous?
MR. SHOCKLEY: I would actually like to -- thank you, Your Honor. I would like to clarify that slightly our -- Service Oil's position is that three -- you cannot have a 308 violation absent a specific request for information. I believe below the argument was made that Service Oil was viable under 308 in addition to other sections because it did not submit a -- or request a permit.

In essence, the liability was found on the failure to apply for a permit under 308. It is our position that 308 , the plain language of 308 requires an individualized request for information.

If you read section 308,
specifically (a), it puts a duty upon the administrator to require an owner or operator of any point source to establish and maintain such records, such reports, install, use, maintain such monitoring equipment or methods
unambiguous that it has to be a particular targeted request before a 308 authority is valid?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, specifically section 308 does not indicate any reference to permit requirements, and I believe that the EPA has taken the position that --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: -- 308 does reference --

MR. SHOCKLEY: -- for our -JUDGE SHEEHAN: Excuse me. 308
does mention target permit requirements referring to 1342 , the 402 section of the act that is the NPDES permit program in sub part (a)(4). So why do you say it doesn't have anything to do with the permitting program, when on its face it seems to do just that?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, the Service
Oil's position is quite simple in that section (a) requires the administrator to issue a request requiring information. A generalized request to submit a permit is
much different than a specific request for information. And -- to this case --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Are you saying that the Agency has no authority to issuc regulations under 308 general rules of broad applicability, it has to go one by one. Is that your position?

MR. SHOCKLEY: That is not the Service Oil's position. Service Oil's position is that while the EPA can issue regulations, the issue is not whether or not they can issue regulations, but how those regulations can be enforced under 308 --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Can I -- let me ask if I can. Let's go back -- your construction began in, I believe April of 2002, let's flashback to March of 2002. Service Oil and its office is planning to clear the 15 or 20 acres at this site the next month. Under your reading, it seems like you would be saying that EPA needs to guess at the fact that you are -- and your office is planning
this construction, and come knock on your door and ask you to submit a permit application. Is that right?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, I don't believe that's our position. Our position is that if you are going to find a violation pursuant to section 308 , you have to have the individualized request. Always keep in mind --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, that's what I am asking. Does EPA have to knock on your door and make an individual request for you to obtain a permit before you begin construction in April. It seems like the logical implication of your argument.

MR. SHOCKLEY: It would have -well, respectfully, Your Honor, the position is that the individualized request is a prerequisite to finding liability pursuant to 308. The permit requirements are to submit a permit. If you are going to find a violation pursuant to 308 , you need to have that
individualized request prior to the finding of liability. And that's a simple --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: How do you square your argument with Ludlum, used by EPA in its brief? It seems to recognize the authority of the administrator to issue these kinds of regulations under section 308 without questioning that authority.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, I would square that argument with the case of in our Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation where the Court recognized the distinction between challenging the issuance of a rule compared to the substance of the rule. And what we are really talking about here is how it's been substantively enforced. Not how it is being -- not how it was enacted but whether and how the EPA is going to enforce section 308.

JUDGE STEIN: Can I ask a few questions here. The section 1221 -- or 122.21 of the regulations, were promulgated
under the authority of 308 . Having been so promulgated, why is not this -- your client's conduct a violation of section 122.21 promulgated under the authority of 308 and therefore a violation of the act?

It seems to me that under your interpretation, then section, I guess, it is 121.2 would really have no meaning. Then what would be the meaning of regulations promulgated under the authority of 308 , which require your client to apply for a permit, and then when you get into a actual enforcement of that you can't really enforce the underlying regulations, but you would have to basically submit an individualized request. Is that your client's position?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Let me make -- thank you, Your Honor, let me make clear. My client's position is that any regulation that's adopted by the EPA must square with section 308 which requires before a finding of liability that individual -- an opportunity to challenge these regulations. And baving not so challenged them, how is it that you can attack the underlying regulations in this form?

MR. SHOCKLEY: As I -- thank you, Your Honor. As I mentioned before we are not challenging the ability of the EPA to adopt regulations, we are challenging the substantive enforcement of those regulations pursuant to section --

JUDGE STEIN: But isn't that precisely what the statute precludes? I mean it seems to me that the whole purpose of the bar on raising this issue in an enforcement proceeding was to prevent precisely the kind of collateral attack that you seem to be asserting here.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Respectfully, Your Honor, I disagree. We specifically, in the case that I referenced before, the Court recognized and distinguished substantive
challenges to a regulation compared with a challenge to the authority of the Agency to make a regulation. And --

JUDGE STEIN: But looking at it -at a slightly different way. Do you dispute that the Agency has an ability to interpret the terms of section 308 of the act?

MR. SHOCKLEY: We do not dispute that an Agency has the authority to interpret section 308, but that that interpretation must be consistent with the plain and unambiguous language of section 308. And the --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But you've really pointed us to nothing unambiguous, expect for, I guess, and this word's in your brief too, the administrator shall require the owner or operator to make reports. Why does making reports somehow gobble up the entirety of 308 and require that every act under 308 be so individualized and targeted when there is otherwise very broad language in 308 ?
individualized request prior to finding my ability under 308 .

JUDGE SHEEHAN: And did Jones Falls not precede three decades of Agency regulations that went exactly the opposite way, non-individualized requests were sufficient.

MR. SHOCKLEY: That is correct, Your Honor, that it did precede that time period of regulations, but keep in mind that it is still good case law, and while the regulations may have changed then Agency's interpretation must still be consistent with the unambiguous -- the text of section 308 , and that the simple text of 308 doesn't reference permits.

It makes the administrator have burden to make a specific request for information. And in fact that was done in this case. The section 308 letter was sent to Service Oil, which Service Oil responded to. The effect of this case, the policy

MR. SHOCKLEY: That is an excellent question, Your Honor. Specifically the reading of 308 puts a burden upon the administrator to make an individualized request, and a subsequent burden upon the individual to respond to that. If you look in sub section (b) of the section, it talks about any records, reports, or information, and doesn't make reference to permits Essentially what --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Is Jones Falls the only case you rely on for your argument here, the only non-legislative history or statutory construction argument, is it Jones Falls, is that what it comes down to?

MR. SHOCKLEY: That is what we are basing our argument on. I cannot at this point say that is the only case that we are relying upon, but as of the brief in time that was the case that we are relying specifically upon for the -- our argument and position that you must make this
effect, is to create penalty that allows or create a liability that allows stacking for the EPA to increase the penalty assessment for a party. And --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Turning to the penalty issue for a moment, if we may, the two themes that seem to recur throughout your brief on the penalty issue seems to be you were in an unsophisticated part of the country not aware of these regulations, and that you had ceded all control for your permitting obligations to other parties.

As far as the cessation or the ceding argument goes, the ALJ was pretty clear -- lots of fact-finding in her decision there that there was no signed agrecment between Service Oil and any general contractor. In fact, you were twice asked to identify a general contractor with whom you had a signed agreement and could produce none.

That Mr. Lenthe, the president of

Service Oil directly hired the contractor so he acted as his own general contractor.
Service Oil identified itself as the applicant and the NOI for the permit coverage, and then was this signatory for terminating the permit coverage.

And a lot of text in your brief is made of your hiring the Whaley and Moore Firms to navigate the permitting regime, but as the ALJ found there was no written contract with Whaley doing that and the contract with Moore was silent on that point.

In fact Moore offered in its proposal to you to undertake those permitting responsibilities and Service Oil refused. So it sounds from the findings below anyhow is if far from giving control to someone else you kept that control in your hands. Can you address that?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Yes, Your Honor, that is an excellent question. With respect to the penalty, keep in mind this is a
business that has been operating in the Red
River Valley for many, many years with significant relationships to the construction and engineering. And it is after all a rural area in which people still, even in large contracts like this enter into oral agreements.

With respect to the permitting requirements, if you would have spoken to the majority of people in the construction industry in Fargo in 2002, and referenced a storm water permit, I believe they would have probably given you a blank look. Our -- is simply --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Is there any record evidence of that blank look?

MR. SHOCKLEY: No, Your Honor. I am just speculating. With respect to there's just not a lot of knowledge at that time regarding permits, and my client is not in the business of construction or engineering, and pursuant to his previous arrangements
relied upon those contractors and engineering firms to help him through this process.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But your client --
MR. SHOCKLEY: If they would have
JUDGE SHEEHAN: You client, as the proceedings below indicate, runs a $\$ 140$-- a $\$ 140$ million a year business at least in ' 05 , 300 employees, 12 sites across two states. The staymark site sounded large, 15 to 20 acres, a restaurant, a parking lot, retail pumps, and so on. It doesn't sound like a very unsophisticated person in the regulatory world.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, I think that is also an excellent question, but I think you can distinguish between the regulatory world of gas and diesel retailing compared to the regulatory world of construction. My client is not in the business of construction, and had to rely upon individuals to help him through that
construction process. In reference --
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, then why didn't he hire people to undertake the regulatory requirements instead of seemingly refusing to do so and holding that power in his hands. It sounded like -- sounds like almost ahead in the same sort of attitude, I want to keep all the chits in my own pocket; I am not going to give them to somebody else. And then now you are claiming, well, no one else was involved, or no one else was helping out, so it was someone else's fault. Just doesn't add up.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, my client relied upon these individuals to help him out through the relationships that he'd had in the past.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Were they signed contracts?

MR. SHOCKLEY: -- and specifically
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Were they signed
contracts or was it all just buddy system or oral handshakes that sort of thing.

MR. SHOCKLEY: It's common practice in the area that you will have handshakes and conversations regarding construction projects -- the contractor --

JUDGE STEIN: Is there any evidence in the record that this is the practice in the community? Can you point me to where --

MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe there --
JUDGE STEIN: -- can you point to where in the record there is evidence that the mode of dealing in this community is through oral contracts rather than written contracts?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe there was a testimony from the owner of Service Oil regarding that to a certain extent. There were no specific fact witnesses called regarding the construction industry in
Fargo-Moorhead at the time.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: So what --

JUDGE STEN: And there were oral contracts or as to other matters?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe the president of Service Oil testified that he had oral agreements with the contractor, and also with Service Oil.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: And what responsibilitics do you think Service Oil has to figure out what the regs require and comply with them instead of being ignorant of them, and in the dark? What should a company like Service Oil do to make sure it is fulfilling its responsibilities?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, I think, in 2002, Service Oil acted appropriately given the area in that he sought out construction contractors and engineering professionals in the business to advice him. Quite simply, he was unaware of any type of regulatory regime requiring storm water permits. He just didn't have any way to recognize that he needed this, and he sought out these
individuals to tell him what permits were needed, what permits were not, and even though he may not have had written agreements, it was his common business practice to engage in this --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why then, when the Moore contracting came to Service Oil, and said, "We will help you obtain permits," those are the words in the ALJ's decision below, and evidently Service Oil's said, "Thank you very much, no."

So it seems like from that finding alone Service Oil was on notice there was a permitting world out there they needed to deal with. So why didn't it then deal with that world.

MR. SHOCKI.EY: I believe that it was an understanding that that was related to building permits. I am not a 100 percent sure on that I'd have to check the record. I'd be happy to submit a memorandum on that issue to the Board, if the Board so desire.


8 (Pages 26 to 29)
that really shows the knowledge of the construction industry and they thought this was a permit much like a building permit rather than a comprehensive set of regulations.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But it sounds like
from what you just said, if you had a building permit, you would see nailed to the wall what the requirements were. Why didn't you seek to find out what the storm water permit, nailed to the wall, would require?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I think there was -there is testimony and e-mails and exhibits below indicating there was this struggle by my client and his agents to find out what exactly was required under that permit. There was no intent not to follow the permit once they obtained it. They were trying to find out what the permit required of them. What they could and could not do and they were just simply unaware -- and they started to follow it --

JUDGE STEIN: Did they ask the permitting authority for a copy?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe they did, I believe that's also in the record if it had been asked for by, if they received a permit from the North Dakota Department of Health and if so where could they post it?

JUDGE STEIN: I am not asking if they received it. But if your allegation is they didn't and your client couldn't get it from the contractor, why didn't your client just call up the person that issued it and ask for a copy?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I believe my client specifically was relying upon the contractor and the engineer to obtain that type of information, and --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: I am looking at the November 15th letter from the North Dakota Department of Health that is addressed to one of your contractors. But it's CC-ing Mr. Lenthe, the president of Service Oil and it
says, "Here's the website where at least you can get the forms to fill out the application." And it references coverage under the storm water permit and even then it gives a permit number. Why couldn't you just call Ms. Abbie, whatever her name is, and ask for the permit?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I specifically, Your Honor, I believe that the reason why is that there was an unfamiliarity with the permitting process, and what was required under the permit. My client --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But you had her name and her phone number on this letter. The person sending the letter was obviously someone you could pick up the phone and call her. Number is right at the bottom of the letter; it doesn't seem like it takes a lot of effort for anybody much less somebody as seemingly sophisticated as the president of Service Oil to figure out a phone number. MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, Your Honor, I
believe that my client relied specifically upon his contractors, and if he were to receive the letter like that he would have told his contractors to take care of the issue, simply because he is not in the construction industry and was relying upon these individuals to help them navigate through the process.

JUDGE WOLGAST: I wanted to clarify one point, Judge Biro here cited to legal theories for liability one of which was section 308 , and I wanted to clarify that you are not challenging her altemate theory of liability.

> MR. SHOCKLEY: This is -- Your Honor, that is in our brief that is correct. We did not challenge the alternative theory of liability; we are challenging theory of liability under sections 308. And there is a -- I would imagine there is a certain desire for this Board to simply ignore our appeal because -- we are only challenging one ground
of liability.
But I would direct you to page 56
of the initial decision in which as part of
the penalty calculation, Judge Biro indicated
that she was considering the complete failure
to apply and obtain an ND -- NPDES permit
prior to starting.
And section 308 would certainly --
violation of section 308 would certainly
contribute to an increase in the penalty
calculation, and therefore that is why we are
challenging the grounds of liability under
section 308 . And I also believe that there
is a -- there is substantial unfairness to
how this section 308 violation came to the
court.
The EPA brought a motion for
accelerated decision on counts 1 and 2 . On
count 2 , I believe Judge Biro found
accelerated -- found for the EPA and left
count 1 open to be tried at a hearing and the
reason was we brought to the Court's
attention that the EPA was still required to prove the factual basis for finding of violation that a discharge did occur.

In her opinion, she noted that there may be some other type of violation under one of several sections, and it was from that point that the EPA then amended its complaints to include this section 308 violation.

And it was substantially unfair and at that point in time to amend the complaint, we then -- it was then tried which we preserved our objections regarding the section 308 complaint, and Service Oil was found liable under the initial decision with respect to the 308 claim.

And that's why we're challenging it because that contributes to the penalty calculation in this case, and also it was unfairly -- in our -- my client's position, it was unfairly raised and prejudicial to my client prior to the start of the trial.

JUDGE STEIN: And what was the nature of the prejudice to have an alternate theory of liability that you didn't apply for a permit? What was the prejudice?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I --
JUDGE STEIN: Was that detailed below?

MR. SHOCKLEY: I think, Your Honor -- I belicve that was detailed below in the briefs that were submitted to the court that it was a late time-period to submit the alternative grounds for liability.

It was on the eve of trial and therefore we had an additional ground to prepare for. It should be recalled that the EPA had nearly 2 years since the time it brought the complaint, to the time that it amended the complaint to this altemative grounds of liability.

JUDGE STEIN: But the ALJ granted the motion and you had the opportunity both during the trial and during briefing to argue
why section 308 liability was inappropriate, so what was the nature of the prejudice?

MR. SHOCKLEY: It -- thank you, Your --

JUDGE STEIN: I mean it seems to me it's really more of a legal challenge than necessarily a factual issue.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, thank you,
Your Honor. The nature of the prejudice was reflected below in that it was a late amendment to the complaint prior to the CERTA trial. You are correct, Your Honor, in that it was argued at the hearing and it was also argued in post- hearing briefs and it is also argued before this tribunal.

And therefore it is a legal issue at this point but it was prejudicial at the time that the amendment was allowed.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Okay, thank you, Mr. Shockley.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Thank you.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Mr. Ryan. second to introduce my co-counsel at the table, I have Mr. Gary Jonesi from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance with me. I have Ms. Elyana Sutin, who is my co-counsel at hearing from Service Oil case from Region 8, and I have Mr. Paul Bengser from the office of General Counsel.

I will first answer the question posed by the Board in its order scheduling hearing. I will then briefly summarize my case and then proceed into the details. Excuse me -- the question posed by the Board is whether an individualized request is a precondition to liability under section 308 of the Clean Water Act, and the answer to that is no.

There are four reasons why the administrative law judge's decision should be affirmed in this case. One, review of the claims brought -- excuse me, alleged in count

## 39

1 of the complaint that the violation of 122.21 and 122.26 of 40 CFR , is precluded in this case because Respondent is challenging a regulation in the context of an enforcement action.

Two, Section 308 of the Clean Water
Act grants the administrative broad authority to collect information both through individualized requests and through regulation.

Three, the EPA issued such a regulation here, 122.21 A , the 122.26 , which is a valid exercise of the administrator's authority under the Act, and four, the administrative law judge's assessment of the facts of the case in applying the section $309(\mathrm{~g})$ penalty factors, in assessing her penalty was appropriate -- inappropriate exercise of her discretion.

Let me address you to these points in detail. First, this 308 claim should not be before the Board today. These clearly
challenging the regulation, 122.21 , if you
2 look at count 1 of the complaint -- of the 3 amended complaint, we are not alleging 4 primarily a violation of 308 , we are alleging 5 primarily a violation of the duty to apply 6 which is in section 122.21 .
for someone to apply for a permit. Only through regulation or through an order is someone required to do, take that affirmative act.

In this case, 122.21 is the basis for our count 1. What -- in 308 only derivatively. So what --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, the 122.21 is derived from 308 --

MR. RYAN: That's right.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: -- and if 308 is the soil and 122.21 is the tree and the soil is defective, or the soil can not give birth to this kind of a tree under their legal argument, it seems like it is an attack on using 308 authority in this way, as well as using the regs in this way.

MR. RYAN: It is Your Honor, but if you look at section 509(b)(2) of the Act in section 40 CFR 2238 (c), it expressly -- the Congress expressly forbid this kind of collateral attack on regulations in the

11 (Pages 38 to 41 )
context of an enforcement action.
Congress spoke directly to this point. He is -- he is 20 years late challenging the regulation.

JUDGE STEIN: The checks to 509, if I recall it specifically preclude judicial review. How do you address that particular language in light of this Board's precedents on that issue?

MR. RYAN: This Board addressed that very issue in Bradenpoint, in which it said that sections -- parts 122 through 125 are essentially akin to judicial review or -excuse me -- would -- excuse me -- that the board would, under extraordinary circumstances, review regulations and I believe that in the Bradenpoint case, you cited to the issue where prior regulation had been invalidated.

But that the -- it would nevertheless generally abide by the NRDC and other -- and its progeny cases saying that
you know, regulations would not be collaterally attacked in the enforcement action.

And if one looks at the -- if one looks at 2238(c) of regulations, it specifically states, actually the administrative for which review could have been attained under section 509 (b)(1) shall not be subject to review in an administrative proceeding. So our regulations speak directly to that point.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Turning to the penalty issue for a moment, it seems like -it seems as if you argue that the penalty analysis and finding here was based entirely on 301 , so there's really no need to stray into 308 country, is that right?

It doesn't differentiate the penalty analysis, doesn't differentiate between 301 and 308, and therefore no need to touch 308 , because it's all under the 301 mantel, is that correct?

MR. RYAN: Not entirely correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, you used the word differentiate in your brief as if it's all one big model and we don't need to get to 308 because it's all 301. But even the sites that Mr. Shockley gave is page 56 --

MR. RYAN: Right.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: -- of the ALJ's
finding, page 63 and other places where it's clearly -- her analysis would be the culpability or nature of circumstances in extent or premised on failure to obtain the permit, which gets back to 308.21 ground --

MR. RYAN: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: So why do you say there is no basis for looking at the failure to obtain a permit?

MR. RYAN: Well, if he is -- well, if Your Honor looks at the -- excuse me -- if Your Honor looks at the number of violations,

45
and that same reference on page 56 , the presiding officer referenced I believe 7 months of violation which would pencil out to approximately 210 days of violations.

Doing the quick math, $\$ 11,000$ per day times 210 , you're -- one reaches statutory maximum penalty very quickly. Proposed penalty in this case was $\$ 40,000$ which was substantially below that. If it -the presiding officer clearly conflated the two 301 and 308 in that one -- in that sentence of page 56 --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But you agree that there are 308 pieces, to use that word and --

MR. RYAN: Yes, I would agree with that, Your Honor, yes, there are a series of 308 piece. However if you look at the references to the discharges without a permit for approximately 7 months, that's 210 days of violations. Given de novo review, the Board certainly can review this decision and find that there is sufficient number of
violations to section 301 , discharging without a permit to substantiate the penalty of this -- well -- and well below the statutory maximum.

JUDGE STEIN: Apart from your argument that it's unnecessary, is the agency objecting to the Board's review under 308 , or you're just arguing that it's unnecessary for us to reach that issue?

MR. RYAN: I believe it's unnecessary. Well, no, I believe that we are objecting, Your Honor, under section 509(b), one that this -- the Board should not be revicwing the section -- the validity --

JUDGE STEIN: No, I'm not asking whether you're looking -- I'm not asking you whether or not we're looking at the underlying regulation, I'm asking whether the Agency is objecting to the Board's consideration of a challenge to the 308 finding of liability? And by virtue of the fact that you brought a case under 308 , the

ALJ has issued a decision under 308, why is it that this Board can't consider that challenge?

MR. RYAN: 40-CFR 2238(c), Your Honor.

JUDGE STEIN: So in other words, your argument is that for any regulation that the agency has issued that we can't consider a respondent's appeal by virtue of a provision like 509?

That all arguments that a party might have as to have that regulation is applied under the circumstances as precluded by 509? I mean, that strikes me as, you know, quite frankly, breathtaking.

MR. RYAN: Well, 1 -- 2238(c) which is the regulation at issue here and regarding review of collateral attacks to regulations clearly forbids the Board that challenge. I mean, the Board certainly can consider it, but it can't be a -- the Board cannot reverse a validly promulgated regulation --

JUDGE STEIN: No one's asking -that's not the question that I'm asking you. I'm asking you a very different question.

The question that I'm asking you is given that you've told us that it's unnecessary to reach the 308 question, if we were to disagree with you and conclude that in -- we believe that it is necessary to reach the 308 claim, are you objecting to our doing that and it seems to me you're saying yes. Is that correct?

MR. RYAN: Yes, that is correct, Your Honor. We should not be reviewing the 308 claim in this form.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Even the penalty aspect as opposed to the liability aspect?

MR. RYAN: Well, the penalty aspect, of course, the judge relied in part on 308 for her violation but in terms of the Respondent's challenge to whether we can bring a 308 claim -- that he's missed the boat on that one.
quite frankly I think the Agency is missing the boat on this one. If you know, you're saying that we can't review this issue of liability then why is it that the Agency is bringing a claim under 308 ?

I mean, I think the breadth that you're trying to sweep under this 509, it goes well beyond what it is that we have historically precluded under you know, under 509.

MR. RYAN: Well, Your Honor, if -JUDGE STEIN: The Appellant has a right to appeal.

MR. RYAN: Of course the Appellant has a right to appeal, I agree with that and the Appellant also has the right to appeal any factual findings that might underlie a violation. That's not the case here. He's not challenging whether he applied for a permit, he's not challenging whether he's submitted the proper applications.
whether the 308 element of the judge's decision, the ALJ's decision should be reviewed, of course it should. All the elements of all of the ALJ's decisions should be reviewed. The question is can -- and what I was trying -- what I was answering was whether they can collaterally attack a 122.21.

JUDGE STEIN: Right, now I understand your position on that.

MR. RYAN: Okay.
JUDGE STEIN: Okay, I think we're clear at this point.

MR. RYAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Another penalty question, Mr. Ryan, the record below indicates that EPA went to Fargo in the fall of ' 02 because there were a "low number" -that from the opinion below - of permits being received.

And then you go out and at least according to the Respondent, 12 of the 13
sites inspected at the time were not compliant. So let's assume that this area was largely off the regulatory map, at least out of the -- away from the eyes of EPA for some period before this action.

If that's true, does that have any effect in your view on the penalty in terms of the failure of the agency if any, to do outreach or to keep an enforcement presence there that would alert people to the need to stay in compliance?

Is there any penalty break to be accorded if this is true to an area where there hadn't been much EPA presence in recent history?

MR. RYAN: No, and the reason why is because the there -- the presiding officer found in her initial decision that there was in fact outreach in the area, and there were in fact, I believe the number was 200 permits issued in North Dakota and in the Fargo area previous ycar by the state. And it's a

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, I'm not talking about liability, I'm talking about penalty. So is there any penalty consideration to be given in circumstances, along the lines I laid them out, not according to what the Judge Biro said --

MR. RYAN: Right.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: -- I'm just asking the question theoretically in some sense, if it is as Respondent says, does that affect the penalty?

MR. RYAN: Under this particular factor, no. I mean, when it comes to the issue of what was in the respondent's mind, what was his general culpability, she did give some credit to that, but in terms of what the local community knew because of perhaps a high rate of non-compliance then I would say no, we should not -- we do not give credit to that.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Another question as
to penalty. Am I correct here that Service Oil here received notice of the action on -the state's action on the permit via a letter but that letter didn't also contain the permit itself?

MR. RYAN: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And why would that bc? Why wouldn't the -- why here didn't the permitting agency make sure that the permittee received the permit and should that have been taken into account in assessing a penally?

MR. RYAN: It was taken into account in assessing the penalty, but to answer your first question was -- why would -- why did the state not provide a copy of the permit, I don't believe the record reflects that.

It apparently was not a practice of the state to provide copies. The letter as Justice Sheehan stated clearly set forth the
website and the judge -- and the ALJ in the decision said in her opinion you could have gone to the website and downloaded the permit.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Well, not exactly.
The letter says that you can go to the website to obtain the forms to fill out -- to get permit coverage. It says nothing about the website containing the permit.

MR. RYAN: Well, I believe the record reflects that the website did have -in fact have the permit on it.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: But the letter didn't say that, is that correct?

MR. RYAN: That's correct, the letter didn't say that, but as Your Honor pointed out earlier they could have picked up the phone and made a phone call. They didn't. They made very few attempts to actually get the permit. They just started guessing as what they needed to do.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Going back for a
moment to the general 308 issue here -MR. RYAN: Yes.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: You added 308.21 when you amended the compliant, it wasn't in the initial complaint?

MR. RYAN: That's correct.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: The Respondent references the Eric Schaffer memo of 2000, I believe, saying that 308 is good grounds to use in enforcement actions if no permit has been applied for. Is the use of 308 in these circumstances -- the use of 308 to enforce against somebody who has not obtained a permit common?

It doesn't seem to have been the first thought in Region 8's mind because it only appeared in the amended complaint, but is it a common practice to use this authority in these circumstances?

MR. RYAN: Yes, it is.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: In Region 8, or nationally, if you know?

MR. RYAN: I believe nationally, I mean, certainly in my region, Region 10, and I believe now in Region 8, I mean, national -- nationally it does as well, Your Honor.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: And I believe we might have -- I might have cut you off a bit earlier when you were beginning to discuss some of the outreach and compliance assistance that had to be done in this area. Can you go into that a bit more? What EPA had done in the Fargo area to spread the word?

MR. RYAN: I believe that the primary actions were taken by the state, not by EPA.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Okay.
MR. RYAN: And the state witness who testified, testified that they had done numerous mailings to construction companies and engineering firms in the area, and that the fact that they had issued over -approximately 200 permits in the state and in
the Fargo area indicated it's certainly -people were aware of the need to get permits.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And is that part of the record?

MR. RYAN: And they also had information sessions, I believe, too.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And is that reflected in the record?

MR. RYAN: That would be in the record, Your Honor. I don't have the site unfortunately. I can provide it to you though.

JUDGE STEIN: Mr. Ryan, counsel for Service Oil pointed us to or argued that his client was prejudiced by virtue of the agencies having raised this 308 issue on the eve of the hearing. Could you respond to that?

MR. RYAN: There was -- no -- yes,
I could, Your Honor. There was no prejudice.
I mean, it was -- the facts that were at issue before the judge did not change as a
result of the adding the 308 claim.
The initial compliant, alleged
failure to comply -- apply for permit simply
alleged a different legal ground. Changing
the legal grounds late in the game doesn't
really change his ability to prepare for
hearing and he was clearly aware of that
claim at that hearing and prepared for it and put on this case.

JUDGE WOLGAST: How --
MR. RYAN: -- prejudice.
JUDGE WOLGAST: -- how soon before
the hearing was the amended complaint submitted?

MR. RYAN: It was I believe a month or two, wasn't it, yes.

JUDGE WOLGAST: It was a month or two?

MR. RYAN: I believe. I don't know off the top of my head, Your Honor.

JUDGE WOLGAST: And did Service Oil ask for extra time to respond to the 308
claim?
MR. RYAN: I don't believe they did, Your Honor.

JUDGE WOLGAST: Thank you.
JUDGE SHEEHAN: Okay, thank you, Mr. Ryan. Would you - do you have more? I should ask.

MR. RYAN: No, Your Honor, I'm done. Thank you.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Five minutes, Mr. Shockley.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Okay, thank you, Your Honor.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: If you wish to --
MR. SHOCKLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd just like to clarify once again that this case is not about the authority of an agency to issue regulations. This is about the application of a regulation pursuant to a statute to a particular set of circumstances in finding a violation for the failure to provide -- apply for a permit
pursuant to section 308. This is not a collateral attack on their authority to issue a regulation, rather it is the application and its interpretation by the agency of how that should be applied in specific circumstances.

JUDGE STEIN: And let me interrupt -- excuse me, let me interrupt you there. So the agency has promulgated this regulation under the authority of 308 .

Are you saying that they can promulgate the regulation and there can be a regulation that requires you to apply for a permit promulgated under 308 but then when the agency goes to enforce it, they can't enforce it under 308 -- under 309 , referencing 308 ? I mean, I'm having difficulty understanding how it is they have the authority to promulgate the regulation, but then how is it that that regulation becomes enforceable if in each and every circumstance where they attempt to enforce
it, a company like yours can come in and say
that they have no authority to enforce it?
MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, that is an excellent question, Your Honor, and I believe it's a distinction -- a careful distinction that must be made between the authority to undertake an act and the substance of the act. And what we're really talking about is the substance of their actions, whether or not the enforcement of 40 CFR section 120.21, which requires a permit -- a person to apply for a permit, can be found as a violation under 308. And 308 --

JUDGE STEIN: Well, if it can't be found as a violation under 308 , under what authority would it be found as a violation? I mean, how would they enforce that provision?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well -- well, I believe Your Honor that --

JUDGE STEIN: Aren't you essentially saying that there's sort of a
null set here? If they can't enforce it under 308, then how would they enforce that regulation?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, the remedy for the EPA would seem to be enforcing -- taking enforcement action against an individual who is discharging sediments or other pollution into waterways without a permit.

JUDGE STEIN: Well, that's a -- but that's a different provision. I mean, there is a regulation on the books that says there's an obligation to apply for the permit and that is a very important obligation and it's a broad applicability, potentially applicable to hundreds, thousands -- hundreds of thousands as potentially facilities across the country and it seems to me that under your argument that regulation -- if we were to accept your argument, how could the agency enforce that regulation? I mean, that can't be what Congress intended?

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, respectfully,

Your Honor, I believe that section 308's purpose is a maintenance, monitoring equipment entry and access to information section giving the authority to the Agency to collect information --

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Why can't that information be in the form of a permit application? Why is a permit application somehow not information being sought by the Agency?

MR. SHOCKLEY; Well, I believe Your Honor that a close strict reading of section 308 does not include any -- it refcrences a collection of information and issuances of specified individualized requests for information.

JUDGE SHEEHAN: Even though the word "individualized" is nowhere to be found on the face -- unambiguously to use your word of 308 , is that right? You say it's plain and it's unambiguous but you can't give us any word or words to back that up, it seems.

MR. SHOCKLEY: Well, Your Honor, it simply does not include the authority to go beyond making specific request to find a violation for 308.

It's a information gathering section and essentially our position is that 122.21 is an application requirement, it's not a requirement that's specific for information.

It's just you must apply and it's for information gathering and record keeping only. In the event that they issue an individualized request, then a violation of 308 can be found, if the facts so indicate a failure to respond to a section 308 information request. And that's what was done in this case. They made a section 308 information request, which subsequently was responded to.

By saying that it is a section 308 violation not to apply for a permit, which is a generalized requirement buried in a

| regulation you're essentially holding every individual who has no knowledge of the permitting requirements culpable under section 308 even though the administrator, even though it -- section 308 specifically references a duty advertent upon the administrator to require the owner or operator of any point source to establish. And it seems that the specific language of section 308 is pointed towards owner or operator referencing a specific reference to individualized requests. <br> JUDGE SHEEHAN: Okay, I think -- we thank you. I think we have it. Thank you all. <br> MR. SHOCKLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. <br> JUDGE SHEEHAN: We are adjourned. SPEAKER: All rise. <br> (Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the HEARING was adjourned.) ***** |  |
| :---: | :---: |
|  |  |
| (202) 464-2400 $\quad$ Beta Cour | $\begin{array}{r} 18 \text { (Page 66) } \\ (800) 522-2382 \end{array}$ |


| A | 15:17 16:4 | allotted 4:11 | 49:22 | 46:18 48:1,2,3 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 32:6 | 7:17 66:4,7 | allow 26:5 | applied 47:13 | 48:4 53:9 |
| ide 42:21 | administrator's | allowed 3:10 | 49:20 56:11 | aspect 48:16, |
| ided 28:7 | 39:13 | 37:18 | 61:5 | 48:18 |
| ability 14:8 15:6 | adopt $14: 8$ | allows 18:1,2 | apply 7:13 13:11 | aspects 3:19 |
| 17:2 59:6 | adopted 13:20 | alternate 33:13 | 34:6 36:3 40:5 | asserting 14:18 |
| abse | advertent 66:6 | 36:2 | 41:1 59:3 | assessing 39:17 |
| accelerated | advice 24:18 | alternative | 60:22 61:1 | 54:12,15 |
| 34:18,20 | advocacy 4:16 | 33:17 36:12,18 | 62:11 63:12 | assessment 18:3 |
| accept 63:19 | affect 53:11 | ambiguous 6:18 | 65:10,21 | 39:15 |
| access 64:3 | affirmative 41 | amend 35:11 | applying 39:1 | assistance 12:11 |
| accorded 52:13 | affirmed 38:21 | amended 35:7 | appropriate | 57:9 |
| account 54:12 | ag 5:22 | 36:18 40:3 | 39:18 | ssu |
| 54:15 | agencies 58: | 56:4,17 59: | appropriately | Assurance |
| accurate 40:9 | agency 1:1 $2: 2,4$ | amendr | 24:15 | 38 |
| acres 10:19 | 3:4 4:22 6:6,18 | 37:11,18 | approximately | attack 14:4,17 |
| 21:11 | 10:4 15:2,6,9 | analysis 43:15 | 1:11 6:2 45: | 41:15,22 51:7 |
| act 3:17 4:1 8:18 | 17:4 46:6,19 | 43:19 44:11 | 45:19 57:22 | 61:2 |
| 9:13 13:5 15:7 | 47:8 49:2,5 | Anna 1:15 3: | April 3:21 4:7 | attacked 43:2 |
| 15:20 26:10,11 | 50:12,15 52:8 | answer 28:15 | 10:16 11:14 | attacks 47:18 |
| 26:12 27:3 | 54:10 60:18 | 38:10,17 54:16 | area 5:11 20:5 | ttained 43:8 |
| 38:17 39:7,14 | 61:4,9,15 | answering 51:6 | 23:4 24:16 | attempt 61:22 |
| 41:4,19 62:7,8 | 63:19 64:4,10 | anybody 32:19 | 27:7 52:2,1 | attempting |
| acted 19:2 24:15 | Agency's 17:12 | Apart 46:5 | 52:19,21 57:9 | 50:19,21 |
| action 39:5 42:1 | agents 30:15 | apparen | 57:11,20 58 | attempts 55:19 |
| 43:3 52:5 54:2 | agree 45:13,15 | 54:20 | argue 36:22 | attention 35:1 |
| 54:3 63:6 | 49:16 50:14 | appeal 1:4 3:7 | 43:14 | ttitude 22:7 |
| actions 56:10 | agreement 18:16 | 3:14,19 33:21 | argued 37:13,14 | authority 6:20 |
| 57:14 62:9 | 18:20 | 47:9 49:14,16 | 37:15 50:13 | 6:22 8:11,17 |
| 3:12 | agreements 20:7 | 49:17 | 58:14 | 9:2 10:4 12:5,8 |
| add 22:13 | 24:5 25:4 | Appeals 1:1 2:14 | arguing 46:8 | 13:1,4,10 15:2 |
| added 56:3 | ahead 22.7 | 3:3 | argument 3:5,13 | 15:9 31:2 39:7 |
| adding 59:1 | 50:16 | APPEARANC... | 4:14 5:3 6:17 | 39:14 41:16 |
| addition 4:4 7:9 | akin 42:1 | 2:1 | 7:8 11:15 12:4 | 56:18 60:17 |
| additional 36:14 | alert 52:10 | appeared | 12:10 16:12,14 | 61:2,10,19 |
| address 19:19 | alerted 28:19 | 56:17 | 16:17,21 18:14 | 62:2,6,16 64:4 |
| 39:20 42:7 | alive 4:16 | Appellant 49:13 | 26:2 41:15 | 65:2 |
| addressed 31:20 | ALJ 18:14 19:10 | 49:15,17 | 46:6 47:7 | Avenue 1:6 2:10 |
| 42:10 | :20 47:1 | applicability | 63:18,19 | aware 18:10 |
| adjourned 66:18 | 55:1 | 10:6 63:14 | arguments | 58:2 59:7 |
| 66:21 | ALJ's 25:9 44:9 | applicable 63:15 | 47: | a.m 1:11 |
| administrative | 51:2,4 | applicant 19:4 | arrangements |  |
| 38:20 39:7,15 | allegation 31:9 | application 11:3 | 20:22 |  |
| 43:7,9 | alleged 38:22 | 28:17 32:3 | asked 4:16 6:6 | b $16: 7$ back 10:15 |
| administrator | 59:2,4 | $60: 1961: 3$ | 18:18 31:5 | back 10:15 $44: 14 \text { 55:22 }$ |
| $\begin{aligned} & 7: 198: 2,8,10 \\ & 8: 179: 2012: 6 \end{aligned}$ | alleging 40:3,4 allocated 4:9 | 64:8,8 $65: 7$ applications | $\begin{array}{\|c} \text { asking } 4: 4 \text { 11:11 } \\ 31: 846: 15,16 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 44: 1455: 22 \\ & 64: 22 \end{aligned}$ |
| 8:17 9:20 12:6 | allocated 4: | applications | 31:8 46:15,16 |  |


| background | Board's 42:8 | 34:11 35:19 | 34:12 35:17 | 33:1 35:22 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5:10 6:16 | 46:7,19 | call 27:18 29:8 | 39:3 40:1 42:4 | 58:15 |
| BANGSER 2:18 | boat 48:22 49:3 | 31:12 32:6,16 | 49:20,21 50:1 | client's 13:2,16 |
| bar 14:15 | Boise 2:6 | 55:18 | change $58: 22$ | 13:19 35:20 |
| based 43:15 | books 63:11 | called 23:19 | 59:6 | close 64:12 |
| basically 13:15 | bottom 32:17 | care 33:4 | changed 17:12 | collateral 14:17 |
| basing 16:17 | Box 2:10 | careful 62:5 | Changing 59:4 | 41:22 47:18 |
| basis 35:2 40:16 | Bradenpoint | carry 8:17,19 | Charles 1:14 3:8 | 61:2 |
| 41:5 44:18 | 42:11,17 | case 5:11 10:2 | check 25:20 28:6 | collaterally 43:2 |
| began 1:10 | breadth 49:7 | 12:10 14:21 | 29:8 | 51:7 |
| 10:16 | break 52:12 | 16:12,18,20 | checks 42:5 | collect 39:8 64:5 |
| beginning 4:10 | breathtaking | 17:11,20,22 | chits 22:8 | collection 64:14 |
| 57:7 | 47:15 | 35:19 38:7,13 | circumstance | come 11:1 62:1 |
| behalf 2:2,8 4:21 | brief 12:5 15:16 | 38:21 39:3,16 | 61:22 | comes 16:15 |
| 5:9 | 16:19 18:8 | 40:14 41:5 | circumstances | 53:14 |
| believe 7:7 8:6 | 19:729:3 | 42:17 45:8 | 42:16 44:12 | common 23:3 |
| 9:6 10:16 11:5 | 33:16 44:4 | 46:22 49:19 | 47:13 53:5 | 25:4 56:14,18 |
| 20:12 23:10,16 | briefing 36:22 | 59:9 60:17 | 56:12,19 60:21 | commonly 5:17 |
| 24:3 25:17 | briefly 38:12 | 65:17 | 61:6 | community 5:16 |
| 28:12 29:17 | briefs 36:10 | cases 42:22 | cited 5:16 33:10 | 23:9,13 53:18 |
| 31:3,4,14 32:9 | 37:14 | CC-ing 31:21 | 42:18 | companies 57:19 |
| 33:1 34:13,19 | bring 48:21 | ceded 18:11 | city 26:3 28:6,9 | company 5:12 |
| 36:9 42:17 | bringing 49:6 | ceding 18:14 | 28:11,14 | 24:11 26:16 |
| 45:2 46:10,11 | broad 8:11 10:5 | cell 3:9 | civil 3:17 | 62:1 |
| 48:8 52:20 | 15:22 39:7 | center 5:20 | claim 35:16 | compared 12:13 |
| 54:18 55:10 | 63:14 | central 6:16 | 39:21 48:9,14 | 15:1 21:18 |
| 56:9 57:1,3,5 | brought 34:17 | CERTA 37:11 | 48:21 49:6 | complaint 35:11 |
| 57:13 58:6 | 34:22 36:17 | certain 3:19 | 59:1,8 60:1 | 35:14 36:17,18 |
| 59:15,19 60:2 | 38:22 40:14 | 23:18 33:20 | claiming 22:10 | 37:11 39:1 |
| 62:4,20 64:1 | 46:22 | certainly 34:8,9 | claims 38:22 | 40:2,3 56:5,17 |
| 64:11 | buddy 23:1 | 40:9 45:21 | clarify 7:4 27:2 | 59:13 |
| Bengser 38:8 | building 25:19 | 47:20 57:2 | 33:9,12 60:16 | complaints 35:8 |
| beyond 49:9 | 26:4,6,21 | 58:1 | Clean 3:17,22 | complete 34:5 |
| 65:3 | 27:14,15 28:3 | cessation 18:13 | 26:10,11 27:3 | compliance 2:16 |
| big 44:5 | 28:7 29:20,21 | CFR 39:2 41:20 | 38:17 39:6 | 26:22 27:19 |
| Biro 3:15 33:10 | 29:22 30:3,8 | 62:10 | clear 6:15 10:18 | 28:4 38:5 |
| 34:4,19 53:7 | burden 16:3,5 | challenge 14:2 | 13:18 18:15 | 52:11 57:8 |
| birth 41:13 | 17:18 | 15:2 33:17 | 51:13 | compliant 52:2 |
| bit 57:6,10 | buried 65:22 | 37:6 46:20 | clearly 39:22 | 56:4 59:2 |
| blank 20:13,16 | business 5:15 | 47:3,19 48:20 | 44:11 45:10 | comply 24:10 |
| board 1:1 2:14 | 20:1,21 21:8 | 50:3,3,6,8 | 47:19 54:22 | 59:3 |
| 3:3,21 25:22 | 21:20 24:18 | challenged 3:20 | 59:7 | complying 27:13 |
| 25:22 33:21 | 25:4 | 14:3 | client 13:11 14:1 | comprehensive |
| $38: 11,1439: 22$ $42 \cdot 101545 \cdot 21$ |  | challenges 15:1 | 20:20 21:3,6 | 30:4 |
| 42:10,15 45:21 | $\mathrm{C}^{-1} \mathrm{C}$ | challenging | 21:20 22:14 | conclude 48:7 |
| 46:13 47:2,19 |  | 12:13 14:8,9 | 30:15 31:10,11 | condition 27:18 |
| 47:20,21 | calculation 34:4 | 33:13,18,22 | 31:14 32:12 | conduct 13:3 |


| conflated 45:10 | copy 27:14 31:2 | 5:20 6:4 31:6 | 46:163:7 | 1:21 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Congress 41:21 | 31:13 54:17 | 31:19 52:21 | discretion 39:19 | enforced 10:13 |
| 42:2 63:21 | correct 17:8 | dark 24:11 | discuss 57:7 | 12:16 |
| consider 47:2,8 | 28:22 33:16 | day 45:6 | dispute 15:5,8 | enforcement |
| 47:20 | 37:12 40:12 | days 45:4, 19 | disregard 26:18 | 2:16 13:13 |
| consideration | 43:22 44:1,15 | de 45:20 | distinction | 14:10,15 38:5 |
| 46:20 50:6 | 48:11,12 54:1 | deal 25:15,15 | 12:12 62:5,5 | 39:4 42:1 43:2 |
| 53:5 | 54:6 55:14,15 | dealing 23:13 | distinguish | 52:9 56:10 |
| considering 34:5 | 56:6 | decades 17:4 | 21:17 | 62:10 63:6 |
| consistent 15:11 | Council 2:17 | decision 3:15 | distingui | enforcing 63:5 |
| 17:13 | counsel 2:4,19 | 18:15 25:9 | 14:22 | engage 25:5 |
| Constitution 1:6 | 4:17 38:9 | 34:3,18 35:15 | Docket 3:6 | engineer 31:16 |
| construction | 58:13 | 8:20 45:21 | doing 5:14 19:11 | engineering 20:4 |
| 5:22 6:1 10:15 | count 34:19,21 | 47:1 51:2,2 | 45:5 48:10 | 20:21 21:1 |
| 11:1,14 16:14 | 38:22 40:2,21 | 2:18 55:2 | door 11:2,12 | 24:17 57:20 |
| 20:3,10,21 | 41:6 | decisions 51:4 | downloaded | enter 6:7,9 20:6 |
| 21:19,21 22:1 | country 18:10 | defective 41:13 | 55:3 | entirely 43:15 |
| 23:5,20 24:16 | 43:17 63:17 | Department 6:4 | drawn 4:14 | 44:1 |
| 26:7,17 27:15 | counts 3:16 | 31:6,20 | DURR 2:14 3:2 | entirety 15:19 |
| 27:22 28:5 | 34:18 | derivatively | duty 7:18 40:5 | entry 64:3 |
| 29:18 30:2 | course 48 | 1:7 | 66:6 | enumerated |
| 33:6 57:19 | 49:15 50:7 | derived 41:9 | D.C 1:6 | 40:16,19 |
| contain 54:4 | 51:3 | desire 25:22 |  | Environmental |
| containing 55:9 | court 5:8 12:12 | 33:20 | E | 1:1,1 2:2,4,14 |
| context 39:4 | 14:21 34:16 | detail 39:21 | E 3:1,1 | 3:2,4 6:5 12:11 |
| 42:1 | 36:10 | detailed 36:6,9 | earlier 55:17 | EPA 9:7 10:10 |
| contract 19:11 | Court's 34:2 | details 38:13 | 57:7 | 10:21 11:11 |
| 19:12 | cover 27:1 | deterrence 26 | East 2:10 | 12:4,18 13:20 |
| contracting 25:7 | coverage 19:5,6 | 26:14,15,15 | effect 17:22 18:1 | 14:8 18:3 |
| contractor 18:18 | 26:7,20 28:20 | developed 5:15 | 52:7 | 34:17,20 35:1 |
| 18:19 19:1,2 | 29:4 32:3 55:8 | devices 3:10 | effort 32:1 | 35:7 36:16 |
| 23:6 24:5 | co-counsel 38:3 | Devil's 4:16 | element 51:1 | 9:11 51:17 |
| 29:14 31:11,15 | 8:7 | diesel 5:13 21:18 | elements 51:4 | 52:4,14 57:10 |
| contractors 21:1 | create 18:1,2 | different 10:1 | else's 22:12 | 57:15 63:5 |
| 24:17 27:8 | credit 53:17,21 | 15:5 48:3 59:4 | Elyana 2:17 | EPA's 50:1 |
| 31:21 33:2,4 | culpability | :10 | 38:6 | equipment 7:22 |
| contracts 20:6 | :12 53:16 | differentiate | embedded 26:10 | 64:3 |
| 22:19 23:1,14 | culpable 66:3 | 43:18,19 44:4 | 6:10 | Eric 56:8 |
| 23:15 24:2 | cu | difficulty 61:18 | employees 21:9 | ESQUIRE 2:3,9 |
| contribute 34:10 | cut 57:6 | direct 34:2 | enact 27:4 | essence 7:12 |
| contributes | CWA 3:7 | directly 19:1 | enacted 12:17 | essentially $16: 10$ |
| 35:18 | CWA-08-2005... | 42:2 43:11 | enforce 12:18 | 42:13 62:22 |
| control 18:11 | 3:6 | disagree 14:20 | 13:13 56:12 | 65:6 66:1 |
| 19:17,18 |  | 48:7 50:15 | 61:15,16,22 | establish 7:20 |
| conversations | D ${ }^{\text {D }}$ D $\cdots$ | discharge 35:3 | 62:2,17 63:1,2 | 66:8 |
| . 5 |  | discharges 45:18 | 63:20 | ethos 40:22 |
| copies 54:21 | Dakota 2:11 | discharging | enforceable | EURIKA 2:14 |


| eve 36:13 58:17 | 44:13,18 52:8 | 64:7 | gobble 15:19 | hiring 19:8 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ent 65:12 | 59:3 60:22 | forms 32:2 55:7 | goes 18:14 27:20 | historically |
| evidence 20:16 | 65:15 | forth $4: 754: 22$ | 29:17 49:9 | 49:10 |
| 23:7,12 | fall 6:3 28:18 | found 3:15 7:12 | 61:15 | history 16:13 |
| evidently 25:10 | 51:17 | 19:10 34:19,20 | going 11:6,21 | 52:15 |
| exactly 17:5 | Falls 16:11,14 | 35:15 52:18 | 12:18 22:9 | hold 4:1 |
| 30:16 55:5 | 17:3 | 62:12,15,16 | 55:22 | holding 22:5 |
| excellent 16:1 | far 18:13 19:17 | 64:18 65:14 | good 3:12 17:11 | 66:1 |
| 19:21 21:16 | Fargo 2:11 5:20 | Foundation | 56:9 | Honor 5:7 7:3 |
| 62:4 | 20:11 26:3 | 12:11 | granted 6:8 | 11:5,17 13:18 |
| excuse 9:11 | 28:11,14 51:17 | four 38:19 39:14 | 36:20 | 14:7,20 16:2 |
| 38:14,22 42:14 | 52:21 57:11 | frankly 47:15 | grants 39:7 | 17:9 19:20 |
| 42:14 44:21 | 58:1 | 49:2 | ground 33:22 | 20:17 27:2,21 |
| 61:8 | Fargo-Moorh | fulfilling 24:13 | 36:14 44:14 | 29:1 32:9,22 |
| exercise 39:13 | 23:21 27:7 | future 27:19 | 59:4 | 33:16 36:8 |
| 39:19 | fault $22: 12$ |  | grounds 34:12 | 37:9,12 38:1 |
| exhibits 30:13 | figure 24:9 | G | 36:12,19 56:9 | 40:13 41:18 |
| expect 4:3 15:15 | 32:21 | G 3:1 | 59:5 | 44:2,16,21,22 |
| expressly 41:20 | fill 32:2 55:7 | game 59:5 | guess 10:21 13:7 | 45:16 46:12 |
| 41:21 | find 11:6,21 | ganged 28:4 | 15:16 | 47:5 48:13 |
| extent 23:18 | 29:9,14 30:10 | Gary 2:15 38:4 | guessing 55:21 | 49:12 50:21 |
| 44:13 | 30:15,19 45:22 | gas 5:13 21:18 |  | 51:14 54:7 |
| extra 59:22 | 65:3 | gathering 65:5 | H | 55:16 57:4 |
| extraordinary | finding 11:19 | 65:11 | hands 19:18 | 58:10,20 59:20 |
| 42:15 | 12:113:21 | general 2:19 | 22:6 | 60:3,8,13,16 |
| eyes 52:4 | 17:1 25:12 | 8:10 10:5 | handshake | 62:4,20 64:1 |
| e-mails 29:15 | 35:2 43:15 | 18:17,19 19 | 23:2,4 | 64:12 65:1 |
| 30:13 | 44:10 46:21 | 26:14 38:9 | happen 27:7 | 66:17 |
|  | 60:21 | 40:22 53:16 | happy 25:21 | Honorable 3:7 |
|  | findings 19:16 | 56:1 | head 59:20 | hundreds 63:15 |
| face 9:17 64:19 | 49:18 | generalized 9:22 | Health 6:4 31:6 | 63:15 |
| facilities 63:16 | firms 19:9 21:2 | 65:22 | 31:20 |  |
| fact 10:21 17:19 | 57:20 | generally 42:21 | hear 28: | I |
| 18:18 19:13 | first 4:12 26:7,8 | getting 26:16 | heard 50:4 | Idaho 2:5,6 |
| 23:19 29:3 | 38:10 39:21 | give 22:9 41:13 | hearing 1:10 | identified 19:3 |
| 46:22 52:19,20 | 50:1154:16 | 53:17,20 64:21 | 3:13 34:21 | identify 18:19 |
| 55:12 57:21 | 56:16 | given 20:13 | 37:13,14 38:7 | ignorant 24:10 |
| factor 53:14 | Five 60:10 | 24:15 45:20 | 38:12 58:17 | ignore 33:21 |
| factors 39:17 | flashback 10:17 | 48:5 53:5 | 59:7,8,13 | imagine 33:20 |
| facts 39:16 | Floor 2:10 | gives 32:5 | 66:21 | implication |
| 58:21 65:14 | focus 3:22 | giving 19:17 | help 21:2,22 | 11:15 |
| factual 5:10 6:15 | follow 4:7 30:17 | 64:4 | 22:15 25:8 | important 63:13 |
| 35:2 37:7 | 30:22 | go 4:12,19 10:6 | 33:7 | inappropriate |
| 49:18 | forbid 41:21 | 10:15 27:13 | helping 22:11 | 37:1 39:18 |
| fact-finding | forbids 47:19 | 50:16 51:21 | high 53:19 | include 35:8 |
| 18:15 | forgive 50:22 | 55:6 57:10 | hire 22:3 | 64:13 65:2 |
| failure 7:13 34:5 | form 14:5 48:14 | 65:2 | hired 19:1 | increase 18:3 |

Beta Court Reporting
(202) 464-2400 www.betareporting.com
(800) 522-2382

| 34:10 | instructed 3:21 | 3:12,15 4:22 | keep 11:9 17:10 | 12:2 13:22 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| indicate 9:5 21:7 | instructions | 5:2 6:11,13 8:5 | 19:22 22:8 | 18:2 33:11,14 |
| 65:14 | 29:21 | 8:7,15 9:8,11 | 52:9 | 33:18,19 34:1 |
| indicated 34:4 | intended 63:21 | 10:3,14 11:10 | keeping 65:11 | 34:12 36:3,12 |
| 58:1 | intent 30:17 | 12:3,20 14:1 | kept 19:18 | 36:19 37:1 |
| indicates 51:17 | interpret 15:6,9 | 14:12 15:4,14 | kind 14:16 41:14 | 38:16 46:21 |
| indicating 29:13 | interpretation | 16:11 17:3 | 41:21 | 48:16 49:5 |
| 30:14 | 13:7 15:10 | 18:5 20:15 | kinds 12:6 | 50:7 53:1,3 |
| individual 8:9 | 17:13 61:4 | 21:3,6 22:2,18 | knew 29:6 53:18 | liable 3:16 35:15 |
| 8:13 11:12 | interpreted | 22:22 23:7,11 | knock 11:1,11 | light 42:8 |
| 13:22 16:6 | 40:11 | 23:22 24:1,7 | know 28:10 43:1 | line 4:15 |
| 63:6 66:2 | interrupt 61:7,8 | 25:6 26:1 | 47:15 49:3,10 | lines 53:6 |
| individualized | intervals 8:2 | 27:10 28:3,16 | 56:22 59:19 | local 26:14,15 |
| 6:217:15 11:8 | introduce 38:3 | 29:2 30:6 31:1 | knowledge | 27:4 53:18 |
| 11:18 12:1 | invalidated | 31:8,18 32:13 | 20:19 27:21 | located 5:19 |
| 13:15 15:21 | 42:19 | 33:9,10 34:4 | 29:18 30:1 | locations 8:1 |
| 16:4 17:1 | involved 5:13 | 34:19 36:1,6 | 66:2 | logical 11:15 |
| 38:15 39:9 | 22:11 | 36:20 37:5,19 | knows 27:22 | longer 27:6 |
| 64:15,18 65:13 | issuance 12:13 | 37:22 40:7 |  | look 16:6 20:13 |
| 66:12 | $26: 5$ | 41:8,11 42:5 | .$^{\text {L }}$ | 20:16 40:2,13 |
| individuals | issuances 64:14 | 43:12 44:3,9 | L 1:15 | 41:19 45:17 |
| 21:22 22:15 | issue 4:1 5:17 | 44:17 45:13 | laid 53:6 | 50:7,12,16 |
| 25:1 $33: 7$ | 6:20 8:11,20 | 46:5,15 47:6 | land 5:22 | looking 15:4 |
| industry 20:11 | 9:21 10:4,10 | 48:1,15,18 | language 7:15 | 31:18 44:18 |
| 23:20 27:22 | 10:11,12 12:6 | 49:1,13 50:5 | 15:12,22 42:8 | 46:16,17 |
| 29:18 30:2 | 14:15 18:6,8 | 51:9,12,15 | 66:9 | looks 43:4,5 |
| 33:6 | 25:22 28:7 | 53:2,7,9,22 | large 20:5 21:10 | 44:21,22 |
| inferences 4:14 | 33:5 37:7,16 | 54:8 55:1,5,13 | largely $52: 3$ | lot 8:22 19:7 |
| information 7:7 | 42:9,11,18 | 55:22 56:3,7 | late 36:11 37:10 | 20:19 21:11 |
| 7:16 8:39:21 | 43:13 46:9 | 56:21 57:5,16 | 42:3 59:5 | 32:18 40:10 |
| 10:2 16:8 | 47:17 49:4 | 58:3,7,13,22 | law 17:11 38:20 | lots 18:15 |
| 17:19 31:17 | 50:8 53:15 | 59:10,12,17,21 | 39:15 | low 51:18 |
| 39:8 58:6 64:3 | 56:1 58:16,22 | 60:4,5,10,14 | left 34:20 | Ludlum 12:4 |
| 64:5,7,9,14,16 | 60:18 61:2 | 61:7 62:14,21 | legal 12:10 |  |
| 65:5,9,11,16 | 65:12 | 63:9 64:6,17 | 33:10 37:6,16 | M |
| 65:18 | issued 31:12 | 66:13,18 | 41:14 59:4,5 | mailings 57:19 |
| initial 3:15 34:3 | 39:11 47:1,8 | Judges 3:7 | Lenthe 18:22 | maintain 7:20 |
| 35:15 52:18 | 52:21 57:21 | judge's 38:20 | 31:22 | 7:22 |
| 56:5 59:2 | issues 4:3,5 6:14 | 39:15 51:1 | letter 17:20 | maintenance |
| inquiries 29:9 <br> insist 6:19 | J ${ }^{\text {J }}$ | judicial 42:6,13 | $\begin{aligned} & 31: 1932: 14,15 \\ & 32: 1833: 3 \end{aligned}$ | 64:2 ${ }_{\text {majority 20:10 }}$ |
| inspected 52:1 | John 2:9 4:20 | June 1:7 | 54:3,4,21 55:6 | making 15:19 |
| inspection 6:10 | 5:9 | jurisdiction 27:4 | 55:13,16 | 65:3 |
| inspections | Jones 16:11,14 | Justice 54:22 | let's 10:15,16 | anner |
| 28:14 | 7:3 |  | 2:2 | mantel 43 |
| inspectors 6:3 | Jonesi 2:15 38:4 | K | liability 3:20 | $\boldsymbol{\operatorname { m a p }} 52: 3$ |
| install 7:21 | judge 1:13,14,15 | Kathie 1:13 3:8 | 7:12 11:19 | March 10:17 |

Mark 2:3 5:1
math 45:5
matter 1:10 3:14
matters 24:2
maximum 45:7
46:4
mean 14:13 37:5
47:14,20 49:7
50:10 53:14
57:2,3 58:21
61:17 62:17 63:10,20
meaning 13:8,9
memo 56:8
memorandum 25:21
mention 9:12
mentioned 14:7
methods 7:22 8:1
million 21:8
mind 11:9 17:10 19:22 53:15 56:16
minutes 4:9,10 4:115:5,7 60:10
missed 48:21
missing 49:2 50:22
mode 23:13
model 44:5
moment 18:6 43:13 56:1
monitoring 7:22 64:2
month 10:19 59:15,17
months 45:3,19
Moore 19:8,12 19:13 25:7
morning 3:12,13
motion 34:17 36:21

## N

N 2:5 3:1
nailed 30:8,11 name 5:8 32:6 32:14 names 4:18 national 57:3 nationally $56: 22$ 57:1,4 nature $36: 2$ 37:2 37:9 44:12 navigate 19:9 33:7
ND 34:6 nearly 36:16 necessarily $37: 7$ necessary $48: 8$ need 11:22 26:19 28:19 43:16,20 44:5 52:10 58:2 needed $24: 22$ 25:2,14 55:21
needs 10:21 never 29:4,5 nevertheless 42:21
NOI 19:4
non 28:4 non-compliance 53:19
non-individua... 17:6
non-legislative 16:13
North 2:11 5:20 6:4 31:6,19 52:21
note 6:8
noted 35:4
notice $1: 11$ 25:13 54:2
November 28:18 31:19
novo 45:20
NPDES 8:20 9:14 34:6
NRDC 42:21
null 63:1
number 3:6 26:12 32:5,14 32:17,21 44:22 45:22 51:18 52:20
numerous 57:19
NW 1:6

## 0

O3:1
objecting 46:7 46:12,19 48:9
objections 35:13
objective 8:18 8:19
obligation 29:7 63:12,13
obligations 18:12
obtain 11:13 25:8 27:8 28:1 31:16 34:6 44:13,19 55:7
obtained 28:20 30:18 56:13
obtaining 6:19 27:10
obviously 32:15
occur 26:22 35:3
offered 19:13
office $2: 4,5,16$ 2:17,19 10:18 10:22 38:4,9
officer 45:2,10 52:17
offset 5:4
Ohnstad 2:9
Oil 1:4 3:6,14,16 4:8,12,21 5:10 5:12 6:9 7:8 10:17 17:21,21 18:17 19:1,3 19:15 23:17 24:4,6,8,12,15 25:7,13 31:22 32:21 35:14 38:7 54:2

58:14 59:21
Oil's 7:5 9:19
10:9,9 25:10
Okay 5:2 29:2
37:19 51:11,12
57:16 60:5,12
66:13
Oli 2:8
once 30:18 60:16
one's $48: 1$
open 34:21
operating 20:1
Operations 2:5
operator 7:19 15:18 66:8,11
opinion 35:4 51:19 55:2
opportunity 14:236:21
opposed 48:16
opposite 17:5
oral 3:5,13 4:13
20:6 23:2,14 24:1,5
Orchard 2:5
order 3:21 4:6,7 6:21 38:11 41:2
orders 4:8
ordinance 26:11 26:21 27:5 28:2
outreach 52:9 52:19 57:8
owner 7:19 15:18 23:17 66:7,10

## P

P3:1
page 34:2 44:7 44:10 45:1,12
parking 21:11
part 9:14 18:9
34:3 48:18
50:5 58:3
particular 4:15

9:1 42:7 53:13
60:20
parties 3:22
18:12
parts 42:12
party 18:4 47:11
Paul 2:18 38:8
penalties $4: 4$
penalty $3: 17,20$
4:3 18:1,3,6,8
19:22 34:4,10
35:18 39:17,18
43:13,14,19
45:7,8 46:2
48:15,17 51:15
52:7,12 53:4,4
53:12 54:1,13
54:15
pencil 45:3
people 8:13 20:5
20:10 22:3
27:14 52:10 58:2
percent 25:19
period 17:10 52:5
permission 6:7,9
permit 6:19,19
7:11,13 9:6,12
9:14,22 11:2
11:13,20,21
13:11 19:4,6
20:12 26:4,6
26:17,18,20,22
27:9,11,13,15
27:16,17,18
28:4,5,6,8,17
28:20,20 29:4
29:6,6,9,15,16
29:20,21 30:3
30:3,8,11,16
30:17,19 31:5
32:4,5,7,12
34:6 36:4 41:1
44:14,19 45:18
46:2 49:21
54:3,5,11,18

| 55:4,8,9,12,20 | points 39:20 | present 2:13 | proposal 19:14 | reach 46:9 48:6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 56:10,14 59:3 | policy 17:22 | 27:14 | Proposed 45:8 | 48:9 50:13 |
| 60:22 61:14 | pollution 63:7 | preserved 35:13 | Protection 1:1 | reaches 45:6 |
| 62:11,12 63:8 | posed 38:11,14 | president 18:22 | 2:2,4 3:4 6:5 | read 7:17 |
| 63:12 64:7,8 | position 7:5,14 | 24:4 31:22 | prove 35:2 | reading 10:20 |
| 65:21 | 9:7,19 10:7,9 | 32:20 | provide 8:3 | 16:3 64:12 |
| permits 16:9 | 10:10 11:5,6 | presiding 3:9 | 54:17,21 58:11 | really 12:15 $13: 8$ |
| 17:16 20:20 | 11:17 13:16,19 | 45:2,10 52:17 | 60:22 | 13:13 15:14 |
| 24:20 25:1,2,8 | 16:22 27:3,5 | pretty 6:15 | provision 47:10 | 29:17 30:1 |
| 25:19 28:1 | 35:20 51:10 | 18:14 | 62:18 63:10 | 37:6 40:8 |
| 51:19 52:20 | 65:6 | prevent 14:16 | pumps 21:12 | 43:16 50:18 |
| 57:22 58:2 | post 29:22 31:7 | previous 20:22 | purpose 14:14 | 59:6 62:8 |
| permittee 54:11 | 37:14 | 52:22 | 64:2 | reason 32:9 |
| permitting 9:16 | potentially | primarily 3:22 | pursuant 1:11 | 34:22 52:16 |
| 18:12 19:9,14 | 63:14,16 | 40:4,5 | 11:7,19,22 | reasons 38:19 |
| 20:8 25:14 | power 22:5 | primary 57:14 | 14:11 20:22 | rebuttal 4:10 5:5 |
| 31:2 32:11 | practice 23:3,8 | prior 5:21 12:1 | 60:20 61:1 | 5:8 |
| 54:10 66:3 | 25:5 54:20 | 17:134:7 | put 59:9 | recall 42:6 |
| person 8:9,9 | 56:18 | 35:22 37:11 | puts 7:18 16:3 | recalled 36:15 |
| 21:13 31:12 | practices 28:11 | 42:18 | P.C 2:9 | receive 29:16 |
| 32:15 62:11 | 28:13 | probably 20:13 | p.m 66:20 | 33:3 |
| phone 32:14,16 | precede 17:4,9 | problem 40:10 | P.O 2:10 | received 29:20 |
| 32:21 55:18,18 | precedents 42:8 | proceed 5:3 |  | 31:5,9 51:20 |
| phones 3:10 | precisely 14:13 | 27:16 38:2,13 | Q | 54:2,11 |
| pick 32:16 | 14:16 | proceeding 4:6 | question 16:2 | recognize 12:5 |
| picked 55:17 | preclude 42:6 | 14:16 43:10 | 19:21 21:16 | 24:21 |
| piece 45:17 | precluded 39:2 | proceedings | 28:15 38:10,14 | recognized |
| pieces 45:14 | 47:13 49:10 | 21:7 | 48:2,3,4,6 | 12:12 14:22 |
| place 28:2 | 50:8 | process 21:2 | 50:11,18,19,20 | record 4:18 |
| places 44:10 | precludes 14:13 | 22:1 28:17 | 51:5,16 53:10 | 20:15 23:8,12 |
| plain 7:14 15:11 | precondition | 32:11 33:8 | 53:22 54:16 | 25:20 29:12 |
| 64:20 | 38:16 | produce 18:20 | 62:4 | 31:4 51:16 |
| planning 10:18 | prejudice 36:2,4 | professionals | questioning 12:8 | 54:18 55:11 |
| 10:22 | 37:2,9 58:20 | 24:17 | questions 4:2,4 | 58:4,8,10 |
| please 3:9,11 5:8 | 59:11 | progeny 42:22 | 4:13,15 12:21 | 65:11 |
| 6:14 | prejudiced | program 8:20 | quick 45:5 | recording 3:10 |
| pocket 22:8 | 58:15 | 9:14,16 | quickly 45:7 | records 7:21 |
| point 7:20 8:16 | prejudicial | projects 23:5 | quite 9:19 24:18 | 16:8 |
| 16:18 19:12 | 35:21 37:17 | promulgate 50:2 | 27:21 47:15 | recur 18:7 |
| 23:9,11 26:2,3 | premised 44:13 | 61:12,19 | 49:2 | Red 5:21 20:1 |
| 33:10 35:7,11 | prepare 36:15 | promulgated |  | reference 9:5,9 |
| 37:17 42:3 | 59:6 | 12:22 13:2,4 |  | 16:9 17:16 |
| 43:11 51:13 | prepared 59:8 | 13:10 47:22 | R3:1 | 22:1 45:1 |
| 66:8 | prerequisite | 61:9,14 | raised 35:21 $58: 16$ | 66:1 |
| pointed 15:15 | 11:19 | proof 26:6 |  | referenced |
| 55:17 58:14 66:10 | prescribe 8:3 presence 52:9,14 | proper 49:22 | raising 14:15 <br> rate 53:19 | $\begin{aligned} & 14: 2120: 11 \\ & 45: 2 \end{aligned}$ |
| 66:10 | presence 52:9,14 | property 6:10 |  | 45:2 |


| references 32:3 | regulatory 8:11 | 62:11 | runs 21:7 | 46:1,12,14 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 45:18 56:8 | 21:13,17,19 | requiring 9:21 | rural 20:4 | 61:1 62:10 |
| 64:13 66:6 | 22:4 24:19 | 24:20 | Ryan 2:3 5:1,1 | 64:1,4,12 65:6 |
| referencing | 52:3 | reserve 4:9 5:5,7 | 37:22 38:1 | 65:15,17,20 |
| 61:17 66:11 | related 25:18 | respect 19:21 | 40:12 41:10,18 | 66:4,5,10 |
| referred 5:17 | relationships | 20:8,18 35:16 | 42:10 44:1,8 | sections 7:9 |
| referring 9:13 | 5:16 20:3 | respectfully 11:4 | 44:15,20 45:15 | 33:19 35:6 |
| reflected 37:10 | 22:16 | 11:17 14:19 | 46:10 47:4,16 | 40:16 42:12 |
| 58:8 | relied 21:1 22:15 | 63:22 | 48:12,17 49:12 | sediments 63:7 |
| reflects 54:19 | 33:1 48:18 | respond 16:6 | 49:15 50:20 | see 28:6 30:8 |
| 55:11 | rely 16:12 21:21 | 58:17 59:22 | 51:11,14,16 | seek 30:10 |
| refuse 6:9 | relying 16:19,20 | 65:15 | 52:16 53:8,13 | seemingly 22:4 |
| refused 19:15 | 31:15 33:6 | responded 17:21 | 54:6,14 55:10 | 32:20 |
| refusing 22:5 | remedy 63:4 | 65:19 | 55:15 56:2,6 | sending 32:15 |
| regarding 20:20 | reports 7:21 | Respondent | 56:20 57:1,13 | sense 6:15 53:10 |
| 23:5,18,20 | 15:18,19 16:8 | 39:3 51:22 | 57:17 58:5,9 | sent 17:20 |
| 28:13,13 29:16 | represent 4:18 | 53:11 56:7 | 58:13,19 59:11 | sentence 45:12 |
| 35:13 47:17 | request 6:217:7 | respondent's | 59:15,19 60:2 | separate 50:18 |
| regime 19:9 | 7:10,16 8:8 9:2 | 47:9 48:20 | 60:6,8 | series 45:16 |
| 24:19 | 9:21,22 10:1 | 53:15 |  | Service 1:4 2:8 |
| region 2:5,17 | 11:8,12,18 | responsibilities | S | 3:5,14,16 4:8 |
| 4:11 5:14 38:8 | 12:1 13:16 | 19:15 24:8,13 | S 3:1 | 4:11,21 5:10 |
| 56:16,21 57:2 | 16:5 17:1,18 | restaurant 21:11 | saw 29:4,5 | 5:12 6:8 7:4,8 |
| 57:2,3 | 38:15 65:3,13 | result 59:1 | saying 10:3,21 | 9:18 10:9,9,17 |
| Regional 2:4,17 | 65:16,18 | retail 21:11 | 40:9 42:22 | 17:21,21 18:17 |
| regs 24:9 41:17 | requests 17:6 | retailing 5:13 | 48:10 49:4 | 19:1,3,15 |
| regulation 13:19 | 39:964:15 | 21:18 | 56:9 61:11 | 23:17 24:4,6,8 |
| 15:1,3 26:4,5 | 66:12 | reverse 47:21 | 62:22 65:20 | 24:12,15 25:7 |
| 39:4,10,12 | require 7:198 | review 38:21 | says 32:1 53:11 | 25:10,13 31:22 |
| 40:1,20 41:2 | 8:12 13:11 | 42:7,13,16 | 55:6,8 63:11 | 32:21 35:14 |
| 42:4,18 46:18 | 15:17,20 24:9 | 43:7,9 45:20 | Schaffer 56:8 | 38:7 54:1 |
| 47:7,12,17,22 | 26:21 29:7 | 45:21 46:7 | scheduling 4:8 | 58:14 59:21 |
| 50:2 60:19 | 30:11 66:7 | 47:18 49:4 | 38:11 | session 3:5 |
| 61:3,9,12,13 | required 26:12 | reviewed 51:3,5 | seated 3:11 | sessions 58:6 |
| 61:19,20 63:3 | 26:13 29:10,14 | reviewing 46:14 | second 38:3 | set 4:7 30:4 |
| 63:11,18,20 | 30:16,19 32:11 | 48:13 | section 7:179:5 | 54:22 60:20 |
| 66:1 | 35:1 41:3 | rhetoric 40:10 | 9:13,20 11:7 | 63:1 |
| regulations 8:11 | requirement | right 11:3 28:21 | 12:7,18,21 | Sheehan 1:14 |
| 8:22 10:5,11 | 26:9 40:22 | 32:17 41:10 | 13:3,7,21 | 3:8,12 4:22 5:2 |
| 10:12,13 12:7 | 65:7,8,22 | 43:17 44:8 | 14:11 15:7,10 | 6:11,13 8:5,7 |
| 12:22 13:9,14 | requirements | 49:14,16,17 | 15:12 16:7,7 | 8:15 9:8,11 |
| 14:3,5,9,10 | 8:21,21 9:6,12 | 50:5 51:9 53:8 | 17:14,20 33:12 | 10:3,14 11:10 |
| 17:5,10,12 | 11:20 20:9 | 64:20 | 34:8,9,13,15 | 12:3 15:14 |
| 18:10 30:5 | 22:4 30:9 66:3 | rise 66:19 | 35:8,14 37:1 | 16:11 17:3 |
| 41:22 42:16 | requires 7:15 | River 5:21 20:2 | 38:16 39:6,16 | 18:5 20:15 |
| 43:1,5,10 | 9:20 13:21 | rule 12:13,14 | 40:6,13,14 | 21:3,6 22:2,18 |
| 47:18 60:18 | 27:3 61:13 | rules 10:5 | 41:19,20 43:8 | 22:22 23:22 |

24:7 25:6 26:1 27:10 28:3,16
29:2 30:6
31:1832:13
37:19,22 40:7
41:8,11 43:12
44:3,9,17
45:13 48:15
51:15 53:2,9
54:22 55:5,13
55:22 56:3,7
56:21 57:5,16
60:5,10,14
64:6,17 66:13
66:18
Shockley 4:19
4:20,20 5:3,6,9
6:11,12,13 7:2
8:6,14 9:4,10
9:18 10:8 11:4
11:16 12:9
13:17 14:6,19
15:8 16:1,16
17:8 19:20
20:17 21:4,15
22:14,20 $23: 3$
23:10,16 24:3
24:14 25:17
27:1,20 28:10
28:22 29:11
30:1231:3,14
32:8,22 33:15
36:5,8 37:3,8
37:20,21 44:7
60:11,12,15
62:3,19 63:4
63:22 64:11
65:1 66:16
SHOKLEY 2:9
show 26:20
shows 30:1
signatory 19:5
signed 18:16,20
22:18,22
significant 5:15 20:3
silent 19:12
simple 9:19 12:2 17:15
simply 20:14 24:1827:21 30:21 33:5,21 59:3 65:2
site 5:18,19,22 6:1,6,7 10:19 21:1058:10
sites 21:9 44:6 52:1
slightly 7:4 15:5
soil $41: 12,12,13$
somebody $22: 9$ 29:8 32:19 56:13
soon 59:12
sophisticated 32:20
sort 22:7 23:2 26:14,16 62:22
sought $24: 16,22$ 64:9
sound 21:12
sounded 21:10 22:6
sounds 19:16 22:6 26:19 30:6
source 7:20 66:8
speak 43:10
SPEAKER 66:19
specific $7: 610: 1$ 17:18 23:19 28:11,13 61:5 65:3,8 66:9,11
specifically $7: 18$ 8:19 9:4 14:20 16:2,21 22:20 31:15 32:8 33:1 42:643:6 66:5
specified 64:15
speculating 20:18
spoke $42: 2$
spoken $20: 9$ spread 57:11 square $12: 3,9$ 13:20
stacking 18:2
start 35:22
started 6:1 30:21 55:20
starting 5:21 34:7
state 4:17 27:16
52:22 54:17,21
57:14,17,22
stated 54:22
statement 6:22
states 1:1 2:4 3:3 21:9 40:15 43:6
state's 54:3
statute 14:13 53:1 60:20
statutory 16:13 45:7 46:4
stay 52:11
staymark 5:18 5:19 21:10
Stein 1:13 3:9 12:20 14:1,12 15:4 23:7,11 24:1 31:1,8 36:1,6,20 37:5 42:5 46:5,15 47:648:149:1 49:13 50:5 51:9,12 58:13 61:7 62:14,21 63:9
step $50: 9,10,17$
storm 20:12 24:20 26:7 27:8 30:10 32:4
stray 4:2 43:16
Street 2:5
strict 53:1 64:12
strikes 47:14
struggle 29:13

30:14
sub 9:14 16:7
subject 43:9
submit 7:10 9:22 11:2,20 13:15 25:2136:11
submitted $36: 10$ 49:22 59:14
subsequent 16:5
subsequently 65:18
substance 12:14 62:7,9
substantial 34:14
substantially 35:1045:9
substantiate 46:2
substantive 14:10,22
substantively 12:16
sufficient 17:7 45:22
summarize 38:12
sure 24:12 25:20 54:10
Sutin 2:17 38:6
sweep $49: 8$
system 23:1

## T

T 2:94:20
table 38:4
take 33:4 38:2 41:3
taken 9:7 54:12 54:14 57:14
takes 32:18
talking 12:15 53:3,3 62:8
talks 8:16 16:7
target 8:12 9:12
targeted 9:2 15:21
tell 5:4 25:1 terminating 19:6
terms 15:7 27:17 48:19 52:7 53:17
testified 24:4 57:18,18
testimony $23: 17$ 28:12 29:12 30:13
text 17:14,15 19:7
thank 5:6 6:16 7:3 13:17 14:6 25:11 27:1 37:3,8,19,21 38:151:14 60:4,5,9,12,15 66:14,14,16
themes 18:7
theoretically 53:10
theories 33:11
theory $33: 13,17$ 33:18 36:3
thing 23:2 27:11 27:12
think 6:14 21:15 21:16 24:8,14 26:9 27:20
28:18 29:22 30:12 36:8 40:8 49:1,2,7 50:9,10,18 51:12 66:13,14
thought 29:19 30:2 56:16
thousands 63:15 63:16
three 7:5 17:4 39:11
Thursday 1:7
time 16:19 17:9 20:19 23:21
29:19 35:11
36:16,17 37:18

52:1 59:22
times 45:6 time-period 36:11
today 39:22
told 33:4 48:5
top 59:20
totaling 3:17
touch 43:21
tree 41:12,14
trial 35:22 36:13 36:22 37:12
tribunal 37:15 tried 34:21 35:12
true $52: 6,13$
trying 30:18 49:8 51:6
turn 3:9
Turning 18:5 26:1 43:12
twice 18:18
Twichell 2:9
two 3:16 18:7 21:9 26:12 39:6 45:11 50:9,17 59:16 59:18
type $24: 19$ 27:6 31:16 35:5

## U

unable 28:15
unambiguous 7:1 9:1 15:12 15:15 17:14 64:21
unambiguously 64:19
unaware 24:19 30:21
underlie 49:18
underlying 13:14 14:5 28:5 46:18 understand 51:10
understanding 25:18 61:18 undertake 19:14 22:3 62:7
undoubtedly $4: 2$
unfair 35:10
unfairly 35:20 35:21
unfairness 34:14 unfamiliarity 32:10 unfortunately 58:11
unique 5:11
United 1:1 2:4 3:3
unnecessary 46:6,8,11 48:6
unsophisticated 18:9 21:13
use 7:21 45:14 56:10,11,12,18 64:19

## V

valid 9:3 39:13
validity 46:14
validly 47:22
Valley 5:21 20:2
viable $7: 8$
view 52:7
violate 27:17
violation 7:6
11:7,21 13:3,5
27:6 34:9,15 35:3,5,9 39:1 40:4,5,17,18 40:19,21 45:3 48:19 49:19 60:21 62:12,15 62:16 65:4,13 65:21
violations 40:15 44:22 45:4,20 46:1
virtue $46: 21$
47:9 58:15
$\mathbf{W}$
wall $30: 9,1$
want 22:8
wanted 33:9,12
Washington 1:6 wasn't 56:4
59:16
water 3:17 4:1
20:12 24:20 26:7,10,11
27:3,8 30:10
32:4 38:17
39:6
waterways 63:8
way 15:5 17:6 24:21 40:11
41:16,17
website 29:8
32:1 55:1,3,7,9
55:11
went 17:5 28:16 51:17
weren't 29:5
West 2:11
we're 35:17
46:17 51:12 62:8
Whaley 19:8,11
wish 5:4,7 60:14
witness 57:17
witnesses 23:19
Wolgast 1:15
3:8 33:9 53:22 54:8 58:3,7
59:10,12,17,21 60:4
wonderful 27:12 word 6:18 44:4 45:14 57:12 64:18,19,22
words 25:9 47:6 64:22
word's 15:16 world 21:14,18 21:19 25:14,16 wouldn't 54:9 written 19:10

23:14 25:3

## X

x 1:2,5
Y
year 21:8 52:22
years 5:14 20:2
36:16 42:3
\$
\$11,000 45:5
\$140 21:7,8
\$35,640 3:18
\$40,000 45:8

## 0

02 28:18, 18
51:18
05 21:8
07-02 1:4 3:7
08 40:10

## 1

134:18,21 39:1
40:2,21 41:6
47:16
10 2:5 57:2
100 25:19
11:04 1:11
12 21:9 51:22
12:00 66:20
120.21 62: 10

1201 1:6
121.21 13:8

122 42:12
122.21 12:22

13:3 39:2 40:1
40:6,20 41:5,8 41:12 51:8
65:7
122.21A 39:12 122.21(a) $50: 2$
122.26 39:2,12

1221 12:21
12542:12
1351:22
13th 2:10

1342 9:13
1435 2:5
15 10:18 21:10
15th 31:19
2
234:18,19 36:16 2nd 2:10
20 10:18 21:10 42:3
200 52:20 57:22
2000 56:8
2002 6:2,3 10:16
10:17 20:11
24:15
2008 1:7
208 2:6
210 45:4,6,19
2238(c) 41:20
43:5 47:4,16
282-3249 2:11
3
38:21
30 4:9,11
30th 3:21 4:7
300 21:9
301 40:15 43:16 43:20,21 44:6 45:11 46:1
308 3:22 4:5
6:14,17,20 7:6 7:9,14,14,15 7:17 9:2,5,8,11 10:5,13 11:7
11:20,22 12:7 12:19 13:1,4
13:10,21 15:7 15:10,12,20,20 15:22 16:3
17:2,14,15,20
33:12,19 34:8 34:9,13,15
35:8,14,16
37:1 38:16
39:6,21 40:4
40:15,18 41:6


